Predicting likelihood of legitimate data loss in email DLP by Faiz, Mohamed Falah et al.
Predicting Likelihood of Legitimate Data Loss in Email DLP
Mohamed Falah Faiza, Junaid Arshada, Mamoun Alazabb, Andrii Shalaginovc
aSchool of Computing and Engineering, University of West London, London, UK
bCollege of Engineering, IT Environment, Charles Darwin University, Australia
cDepartment of Information Security and Communication Technology, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway
Abstract
The volume and variety of data collected for modern organizations has increased significantly over the last decade
necessitating the detection and prevention of disclosure of sensitive data. Data loss prevention is an embedded process
used to protect against disclosure of sensitive data to external uncontrolled environments. A typical Data Loss Prevention
(DLP) system uses custom policies to identify and prevent accidental and malicious data leakage producing large number
of security alerts including significant volume of false positives. Consequently, identifying legitimate data loss can
be very challenging as each incident comprises of different characteristics often requiring extensive intervention by a
domain expert to review alerts individually. This limits the ability to detect data loss alerts in real-time making
organisations vulnerable to financial and reputational damages. The aim of this research is to strengthen data loss
detection capabilities of a DLP system by implementing a machine learning model to predict the likelihood of legitimate
data loss. We conducted extensive experimentation using Decision Tree and Random Forest algorithms with historical
email incident data collected by a globally established telecommunication enterprise. The final model produced with
Random Forest algorithm was identified as the most effective as it was successfully able to predict approximately 95% data
loss incidents accurately with an average true positive value of 90%. Furthermore, the proposed solution successfully
enables identification of legitimate data loss in email DLP whilst facilitating prioritisation of real data loss through
human-understandable explanation of the decision thereby improving the efficiency of the process.
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1. Introduction
The volume and variety of data collected for modern or-
ganizations has increased significantly over the last decade.
The advancements in and pervasive use of digital technolo-
gies have a profound role in it [1] resulting in continuous
extraordinary growth in the volume of data reaching up to
175 ZByte by 2025 as predicted by International Data Cor-
poration (IDC) in [2]. Furthermore, the risk to information
security in the current age has raised manifold with signif-
icant increase in incidents of data breach. A recent study
by Accenture [3] has revealed that the data breaches have
increased by nearly two-fold in the five years since 2012, in-
creasing from 68 in 2012 to 130 in 2017. Typically, such in-
cidents involving large organizations often result in leaking
customer personal and financial data. For instance, recent
data breach incident reported by British Airways resulted
in leakage of 380,000 customer personal and financial data
[4]. Furthermore, the volume and variety of attacks on or-
ganizations have become increasingly sophisticated as re-
ported by European Agency for Network and Information
Security (ENISA) in [5] making protection against them
a significant challenge. Moreover, recent introduction of
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [6] by the
European Union has increased emphasis on protection of
security and privacy in general and for the personal data in
particular especially due to significant financial penalties
for non-compliance.
Within this context, Data Loss Prevention (DLP) has
a profound role in achieving defence in depth where it can
be considered as a layer of defence system to achieve secu-
rity of data at-rest, data in-motion, and data-in-use. Typi-
cally, a DLP system represents a set of tools and embedded
processes used to ensure that sensitive data is not lost,
misused, or accessed by unauthorized users [7]. A DLP
system achieves this by providing an in-depth insight into
data usage (access) and transportation (sharing) within an
organization. With the significant increase in the cyber-
attacks targeting data theft, use of systems such as DLP
has also increased with a recent study [8] indicating 62%
of organizations adopting such solutions as part of their
organizational security architecture.
Although a DLP system is effective in providing an in-
depth insight into how a monitored system is being used,
it can also increase the complexity of the threat detection
task. For instance, a DLP system can produce large num-
ber of periodic alerts based on an organization’s security
policies which makes prioritising DLP incidents extremely
challenging task. Furthermore, in its default implementa-
tion, DLP serves as an auditing system which is aimed at
collecting user interactions with data in an offline manner.
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The extraordinary increase in the volume and variety
of attacks as well as monitoring capabilities of DLP sys-
tems introduce novel opportunities to achieve real-time,
intelligent analytics to aid protection against data theft.
However, achieving an effective solution to these challenges
requires intelligent data processing abilities to address the
scale and complexity of the alert data. In this context, ma-
chine learning has been historically used to address com-
plex challenges across different domains including intru-
sion detection and response [9, 10, 11, 12, 13], healthcare
[14] and business intelligence [15]. The focus of our re-
search is to utilize machine learning techniques to enhance
the capability of a typical DLP system to facilitate proac-
tive defence against insider threats. In particular, we aim
to assess the feasibility of our proposed approach to pre-
dict likelihood of data loss based on historical DLP data.
We conducted rigorous experimentation and analysis using
real-life data provided by a large UK telecommunication
provider with the view to assess use of our approach in
real world systems. Additionally, we envisage evaluating
whether historic alert information such as (when? how?
and what was leaked) can be used to identify legitimate
data loss in advance as well as help assess real data loss
incidents.
Therefore, we make the following contributions:
• We present a novel machine learning-based approach
to use the incident data produced by a DLP system
to enhance protection against data theft. We specif-
ically focus at the Email DLP with data collected
from a live installation of DLP system within a large
telecommunication provider.
• We conducted an in-depth evaluation of using ma-
chine learning techniques to achieve effective protec-
tion against data theft and insider threats. In partic-
ular, we use Decision Trees and Random Forest algo-
rithms with varied experimental settings to achieve
a rigorous analysis of their feasibility to address the
challenge of data loss prediction.
• Based on the outcomes of our experimentation and
analysis of the DLP data under study, we develop
an intelligent machine learning model that is able to
predict legitimate data Loss incidents in Email DLP
with approximately 95% accuracy and an average
true positive rate of 90%.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents a background knowledge about DLP systems, their
different types as well as examples of existing DLP sys-
tems. Section 3 presents a critical overview of existing
work related to this research identifying gap which is ad-
dressed by this paper. This is followed by a detailed de-
scription of the data used in this research in section 4
along with consideration with respect to feature extrac-
tion and data quality. Section 5 includes a detailed ac-
count of experimentation methodology as well as different
experiments performed with the chosen machine learning
techniques followed by an in-depth analysis of the results
in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Data Loss Prevention
Due to the extraordinary influx in the data generation
capabilities of modern computing systems, data has be-
come one of the most important assets for all types of or-
ganisations including Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
(SME) to large organisations. Safeguarding this data can
be extremely challenging as organisations are moving to-
wards a digital culture and therefore issues such as acces-
sibility and policy enforcement become non-trivial. How-
ever, leakage of sensitive data can cause enormous damage
to an organisation, in particular, it could cause financial
damage in terms of major fines as governed by the GDPR
as well as reputational damage or damage to organisa-
tional growth. In this context, Data Loss Prevention or
Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) is a system with well-
constructed processes which is aimed at protecting against
disclosure of sensitive data to outside the organisation. A
DLP system can be visualised as a set of tools with embed-
ded processes used to ensure sensitive data is not lost, mis-
used, or accessed by unauthorized users [7]. Such systems
are often setup with range of complex information security
policies to meet an organisation’s baseline security require-
ments. A DLP system preforms a deep content/context
analysis aiming to identify keywords (classified attributes)
such as financial data (e.g. credit card number), intel-
lectual property (IP), legal data, source code, personally
identifiable information (PII) and much more [16, 17].
2.1. Data loss detection methods
The primary goal of a DLP solution is to detect ac-
cidental and/or malicious data leakage of corporate data
and notify security administrator immediately in order to
manage the data loss risk in a timely manner. Based on
the knowledge extracted from the DLP incident alerts, an
organization can implement preventative measures by re-
fining DLP security policies to avoid future occurrence of
similar incidents. As the scope of data loss prevention is
broad, a number of detection methods are commonly used
by DLP systems such as context-based, content-based, and
content tagging [18, 16]. Context-based data inspection re-
lies on analyzing contextual information such as source,
destination, size, or recipient of data item in question,
while content-based data inspection uses techniques such
as pattern or regular expression matching, and text anal-
ysis. Content tagging assigns tags to sensitive data items
that form basis for this detection method. In this respect,
there are two major approaches in developing model for
the underlying DLP solution as outlined in [18, 19] i.e.
specification and learning based approaches. Both these
approaches are independent of the data endpoint on which
they are applied as well as the detection method.
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Understanding the scope of DLP is important as this
can help understand the impact of research presented in
this paper. In this context, Salem et al. [20] presented a
commonly adapted taxonomy for DLP system which cat-
egorizes them based on the scope of protection or type of
data as explained below as well as presented in Fig 1.
• Data in use refers to data that user presently in-
teracts via network endpoint device (laptop, desk-
top computer, and iPad/tablet) in the form of text,
documents and applications. A DLP system oper-
ating at data in use level, monitors and alerts un-
wanted activities which violate organisation infor-
mation security policies. Such activities can include
copy/paste/transfer, external uploads, print and screen-
capture operations.
• Data in motion or transit refers to data travelling
through a computer network from one node to an-
other node. Data can travel either through internal
(private) network or external (public) network such
as a workstation residing outside controlled environ-
ment. There are three common types of transfer of
data i.e. Public networks, Private networks and Lo-
cal devices. A typical example can be where an email
with a sensitive information sent to an unintended
recipient is considered as affirmative data loss and
most of the lost data cannot be recovered.
• Data at rest refers to data that resides within per-
sistent storage units and other repositories such as
hard drives, databases, cloud storage, SharePoint,
file servers and local network drives. A DLP sys-
tem can monitor and prevent unwanted behaviour
in a proactive fashion while this state has been con-
sidered as more secure than data-in-motion as data
does not always leave the controlled environment.
Figure 1: Different scopes of data loss prevention systems
With regards to the different types of DLP presented
above, each protection scope can be implemented individ-
ually as well as being complementary to each other. How-
ever, a DLP system with all three protection scopes will
enable the organisation to achieve a layered defence-in-
depth. Furthermore, the research presented in this paper
is focused at Data in motion or transit with particular
emphasis on the data loss through sent emails.
3. Related Works
The research presented in this paper is related to data
loss prevention, threat detection and intelligent classifica-
tion. We present a summary of related research from these
domains below.
Machine Learning (ML) and Advanced Data Analytics
have been historically used to successfully address vari-
ety of cyber security challenges and have proven ability
to train from real-world data, handle impression and solve
problems such as classification, clustering and prediction.
Effectiveness of ML techniques in this domain has led to
the development of specialist systems such as DLP. For
instance, Symantec has been looking into DLP through
ML-assisted processing already since [21]. It was described
that the conventional ways of looking for such data traces
are either describing through matching known keywords or
fingerprinting through matching parts of files. However,
those technologies are incapable of handling challenges re-
lated to Big Data paradigm such as data veracity and va-
riety [22]. Therefore, the idea is to utilize training and
testing phases in machine learning to be able to detect
new data loss events through intelligent models based on
historical data. Another product available to end users
is DLP solution by Forcepoint that offers ability to clas-
sify previously unseen data as well as train model through
flagging documents and files [23]. Finally, Jaiswal et al.
[24] patented a detection solution based on the machine
learning through feature extraction and binary classifica-
tion model training based on the corresponding documents
from both classes.
Wu et al. [25] proposed a DLP solution based on
user keystroke profiling to address an existing problem
(file format issue) within DLP systems. In particular, a
typical DLP system scans various files with different for-
mats. However, any unsupported file types will be left un-
scanned leading to undesired risk. Authors used Support
Vector Machine (SVM) to build keystroke profiles measur-
ing the cost of character types switching time and typing
frequency of each user. In addition, the proposed solution
identified creator of the content enabling incident review-
ers to make decisions based on the file origin. Although
the information about the content originator can be very
useful when assessing an incident, the proposed solution
did not support existing DLP systems therefore limiting
its interoperability with existing systems.
Carvalho et al. [26] represents one of the earliest ap-
proaches to data loss and proposed a DLP solution using
K-Nearest Neighbours (KNN) algorithm and textual con-
tent method known as Cosine method. The proposed so-
lution addressed data loss caused through corporate email
aiming to predict accidental data loss based on recipient
email addresses This study is particularly interesting as
the focus is similar to our research. The study used an
assumption considering unknown email recipient address
as an anomaly. The study has used semi-synthetic data
along with social network data which is about 1,100 sim-
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ulated incidents from 20 users. They produced scoring for
each labelled data where the recipient with the lowest pre-
dicted score considered as a data leak (outlier). Although
the proposed model achieved high accuracy, i.e. 82%, how-
ever the process was reactive as it attempted to identify
unknown emails recipients based on pre-defined heuristics
rather than preventing a data loss. A major drawback of
this approach is that it does not take into account emails
sent to a receiver without any previous interactions leading
to increase in false positive rate.
Costante et al. [19] proposed a DLP solution based
on hybrid approach which attempts to detect potential
data leakage by spotting anomalies in database transac-
tions. The authors used a white-box anomaly-based ap-
proach (minimizing time required to map a rule with a new
alert) to detect unseen transactions while a rule-based en-
gine is used to prevent any activities that are previously
identified as malicious. This work was later extended in
[27] where the authors used histogram based profiling of
database usage enhanced with aggregated feature variables
and transaction flow analysis facilitating detection of com-
plex threats. The study used real-world dataset contain-
ing 12,040,910 records reporting high detection rate with
a 0.003% false positive rate.
Kyrre W. et al. [28] used Bayesian networks (BN) to
implement a scoring based approach to indicate potential
data leakage through insider threat. The threat scores
were based on number of known insider threat character-
istics and aggregated data generated by existing DLP sys-
tems. The threat score is then compared with classification
set by the DLP system and the indication of insider threat
is derived for incidents where a misclassification or no clas-
sification is identified. The study attempted to identify po-
tential manipulation attacks by feature vectors of the score
summary statistics in order to allow each user to be com-
pared with past behaviour as well as with the behaviour of
team. The approach produced a high false positives rate
when detecting anomalies, especially when the number of
feature variables is high.
Vukovic et al. [18] presented another approach for data
loss prevention based on a rule engine and threat estima-
tion. The authors presented the pioneer effort focused at
supporting an existing DLP system that is already in pro-
duction environment. The proposed approach uses risk as-
sessment via metrics such as destination of the file, count
of time since last destination was evaluated, and number of
detected suspicious messages for the given recipient, etc.
The study used a real-world case-study to demonstrate
how proposed approach may work for different breach sce-
narios however the approach can be improved by imple-
menting it with a machine learning algorithm.
In addition to the above, a number of efforts have been
made to complement DLP systems in achieving detec-
tion of threats in general and insider threats in particular.
For instance, Kim et al. [29] proposed an anomaly-based
system to identify targeted cyber attack known as Ad-
vanced Persistent Threat (APT). Although the approach
also overlaps the domain of intrusion detection, it is con-
sidered relevant due to its use of behavioural data from
sources such as network, host, security equipment and de-
vices. The study used Hadoop framework and Map Reduce
to implement the solution where it counted the behaviour
features of each process and returned the feature descrip-
tion as a results. Similarly, Kandias et al. [30] presented
a study focused on insider threats where the main aim is
to rank users based on various factors and then used the
score to predict vulnerable users who may potentially be
dangerous to the organisation as well as the IT systems.
The authors used data from various Information Systems
such as real-time data from an Intrusion Detection System
(IDS), User taxonomy, Psychological Profiling (applied so-
cial engineering theory) and data gathered from honeypot
technique.
In summary, current research and methodological ap-
proaches are mostly focused at identification or preven-
tion of data loss whereas limited efforts have been made
to supplement existing DLP systems to facilitate intelli-
gent use of visibility (data loss alerts) provided by such
systems. This is significant because a DLP system often
triggers high number of alerts based on complex policies
making it non-trivial for an incident reviewer to analyze
each alert individually for data loss. Existing solutions do
not provide support in identifying and prioritising events
that comprises real data loss as identified by [? 18]. There-
fore there exists a gap in literature to supplement a DLP
framework to achieve intelligent threat estimation to mit-
igate potential threats in a timely manner. Within this
context, this research aims to address this gap by propos-
ing an intelligent mechanism to predict and prioritise gen-
uine data loss enabling an organisation to (i) be alert of
particular users groups who are vulnerable (ii) implement
preventative measures in advance such as content or con-
text blocking, and (iii) achieve proactive security commu-
nications ahead of threat occurrence.
4. Data Collection and Preparation
The focus of this research is to achieve an intelligent
analytics of alerts generated by a DLP system to support
likelihood prediction of the legitimate data loss through
email. In order to achieve applicability and effectiveness
of the outcomes of this research, we used data from a
live DLP system installation containing historical DLP
email incidents data from a leading UK telecommunica-
tion company. The dataset was generated over a period
of three months from September 2018 and contained 8,117
records for 1,419 unique users. In order to comply with or-
ganisational policies and UK/EU regulations such as the
GDPR and the UK Data Protection Act 2018 [31] set
out to protect individual’s privacy, the dataset was fully-
anonymised. In addition, the dataset was semi-synthesised
in order to achieve confidentiality of the results produced
in this project. A detailed description of the different
features within the data set is presented in the Table 1.
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(a) alert distribution w.r.t. severity (b) alert distribution w.r.t. users
(c) Distribution of data loss occurrences (d) Distribution of alerts by severity
(e) Number of keyword matches for each incident (f) Distribution of data loss alerts by employee class
Figure 2: Characteristics of data used in the experimentation
Furthermore, an analysis of different characteristics of the
data such as alert distribution with respect to incident
severity, users, employee class (organizational roles) and
number of incidents per user is presented in Fig 2. The
data used for these experimentation contains alerts which
represent different user profiles as well as an even distribu-
tion of different severity levels. For instance, as illustrated
by Fig 2.b, the alerts captured by the data present an
even coverage of users within the system with significant
majority of incidents representing users where number of
incidents per user is less than 3. Furthermore, as presented









1 DummyID integer pre-
investigation
User No Unique user
2 Type Char pre-
investigation
Incidnet Yes Incident type; email
3 Severity Char Pre-
investigation
Incident Yes Incident Severity e.g. (High, Medium
and Low)
4 Sent Date Pre-
investigation
Incident Yes Incident occurred date
5 Policy Char Pre-
investigation
Incident Yes DLP policy indicates type of data e.g.
(personal data policy /Intellectual prop-
erty policy)
6 Matches Integer Pre-
investigation
Incident Yes Keyword count in the email





Incident Yes if email contained an attachment
9 Subject Char Pre-
investigation
Incident Yes Subject of the email (RE/FW/New)
10 Recipient(s) Char Pre-
investigation
Incident Yes number of recipients. (internal/external)
11 Department Char Pre-
investigation
User Yes User department
12 ID Integer Pre-
investigation










Incident No if user have been contacted before
(Yes/No)
15 Data Loss Boolean Post-
Investigation
Incident Yes whether the incident is identified as data
loss or not (Yes/No)
16 Classification Char Post-
Investigation






Incident No if the incident needs tuning due to Falsely
captured by the system
18 Outcome Char Post-
Investigation
Incident No incident outcome;
training/malicious/non-breach
Table 1: DLP email feature descriptions
are distributed across different levels and therefore data is
not skewed towards incidents with specific threat level and
facilitates good coverage.
Within the data collected for this research, every inci-
dent has a life cycle and can have a status such as new,
triaged, investigation, false positive and closed. Each sta-
tus can have number of incidents, however, in order to
select relevant data for this research, different variables
are grouped into two classes such as pre-investigation (an
incident not assessed by a security reviewer) and post-
investigation (fully assessed incidents) as also highlighted
in the Table 1. Any incident that is partially assessed
would have the status set to triaged or investigation.
4.1. Feature Extraction and Engineering
As part of data preparation process, a number of con-
cerns were identified with potentially significant impact
to the overall experimentation and consequently the out-
comes. These are detailed below.
• Post-investigation variables are not usable due to
their life cycle status, and therefore, only pre-investigation
variables can be used to train the model.
• The Data Loss feature represents the outcome of in-
vestigation for an incident with values Yes or No and
is populated through domain knowledge and risk as-
sessment by an experienced administrator. There-
fore, any incident with the status New, False Posi-
tive and Triaged are not used to train the model as
they do not have value for the Data Loss field.
• Some features have inconsistent or unstructured val-
ues. For instance, Subject is classified as usable fea-
ture in the Table 1 however, each subject line is
unique and have different values. Omitting these
feature makes no data for prediction. In addition, a
variable with high number of unique values may not
be handled by certain algorithm. For instance, Ran-
dom Forest algorithm does not handle more than 53
unique categories. This can affect the performance
of the overall model and has been addressed as part
of feature engineering process in the next section.
• Majority of the pre-investigation variables are cat-
egorical therefore replacing missing values with a
mathematical function such as mean value of the
column does not apply to this problem. Some values
were unrecoverable, therefore carefully omitted while
other problems were addressed later in the experi-
ments by adapting different methods such as trans-
forming features, scaling, factorising and aggregating
new features as discussed in section 4.1.
In view of the above and to achieve quality and rigor of
the experimentation process, a feature engineering process
was conducted. Feature engineering task is a vital initial
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data pre-processing task that can help avoid bias and lack
of generalization of the model. In order to understand the
properties of the collected data, an Exploratory Data An-
alytics (EDA) [32] exercise was performed. It was discov-
ered that although features such as subject, department,
sent date, recipients could be significant to the detection
model, data for these features in the original dataset are
not compatible with the machine learning algorithms used
and therefore required transformation. In this regard, the
following four features are transformed using existing data
to align these to the requirements of the machine learning
algorithms used.
Feature 01 - Subject: The value of the feature Sub-
ject in the original dataset contains textual information.
Although the complete subject line can be used as part
of an interesting text analysis approach for future, how-
ever, for this research, we classify the subject into three
categories i.e. Forward, Reply and New as follows:
• Forward:: Incidents with subject line containing word
FW: is considered as a forwarded message, therefore
all the characters are replaced with the word âĂĲ-
ForwardâĂİ.
• Reply : Incident with subject line containing word
RE: is considered as a replied message, therefore all
the text is replaced with the word âĂĲReplyâĂİ.
• New : Any incident with none of the above characters
is considered as a new email composed by an internal
user.
Feature 02 - Department Similar to the above, a scoring-
based approach was developed for the Department variable
resulting in 3 qualitative variables as explained below.
• Avg_inc_per_dpt_total : number of users involved
in a data loss incident for each department divided
by the total number of incidents
• By_dpt_Median: number of incidents per user in
each department including non-data loss incidents
and divided by the median of the department
• Avg_of_dpt_total : incidents per users in each de-
partment divided by the average of the total inci-
dents of all departments
The above variables provide an in-depth insight into the
linkage between data loss incidents and users from specific
organizational units of an organization.
Feature 03 - Recipients: Currently this variable
contains list of recipients such as internal, trusted exter-
nal or personal/non-corporate. Therefore, this variable is
transformed into an acceptable recipient score based on
number of internal recipients in an email as explained be-
low.
• Total number of internal recipients in an incident (x)
/ total number of recipients (y)
• Acceptable Recipients Score (ARS) = number of in-
ternal recipients (x) / (y) total number of recipients
Feature 04 - Sent: The Sent feature describes when
the incident has occurred in a date format. Although this
is a useful feature, however, this research does not in-
tend to perform any time series functions. Therefore, the
time/data variable is transformed into qualitative variable.
For example, 04/07/2018 transformed into [7, 18].
In addition to the mentioned above, features 3 (DuringOf-
ficeHrs) and 5 (HasInternalReci) in the Table 2 have been
transformed in the similar way from the DLP Email dataset
while feature 1 (Localclass), feature 2 (Employment.status)
and feature 4 (AppAccess) are generated by a dedicated IT
system available in the organisation.
5. Experimental Design
Since the aim of this research is to predict data loss for
DLP incidents, this problem can be envisaged as a clas-
sification challenge. Within this context, we conducted
rigorous experimentation using two different approaches
where the first set of experiments were conducted using
decision tree Classification and Regression (CART) [33]
algorithm and the second experiments were based on en-
semble tree (Random Forest) algorithm [34]. The choice
of machine learning techniques is motivated by the ability
of chosen techniques to produce not only the classifica-
tion outcome but also reasoning for each classification fa-
cilitating deeper analysis and review by a domain expert.
Furthermore, these machine learning techniques have been
used successfully to address classification challenges within
security domain such as intrusion detection [10, 9] and
spam call identification [35] as well as in wider application
domains such as healthcare [14] and business intelligence
[15]. The experimentation has been conducted using SQL
language format to fetch data from different databases and
warehouses, while Python libraries are used to perform
data wrangling and feature engineering tasks. The ma-
chine learning models were implemented using the popular
data analytics framework R [36] on a standard computing
machine with a processing power of 2.4GHz Intel i5 pro-
cessor with a 8 GB memory running on Microsoft windows
10 operating system.
Each experiment consisted of number of iterations sim-
ulating different scenarios to identify the performance and
efficiency of the classification algorithms. The output is
produced in a form of confusion matrices which were used
to evaluate the model at the end of each iteration. The
optimal model is achieved when the classifier predicts data
loss in terms of true positive rate above 85% while false
positive rate should be less than 20% to be accepted. In
this context, high accuracy with p-value less than 0.05
means that the results of the model is of high significance
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1 Local.class Char Pre/Post-
Investigation
User Yes class of the particular user Class (E, F,
G, H, S & U)
2 Employment.status Char Pre/Post-
Investigation
User Yes user’s employment status
3 DuringOfficeHrs Boolean Pre/Post-
Investigation
Incident Yes whether the incident occurred between
8am & 6pm (Yes/No)
4 AppAccess Char Pre/Post-
Investigation
User Yes type of access to the network (Basic/Full)
5 Has_Internal_Reci Boolean Pre- Investigation Incident Yes if incident has internal recipients
Table 2: Additional features from organizational systems
and the null hypothesis can be rejected. On the contrary,
for any model with p-value greater than 0.05, the null hy-
pothesis will be accepted as this would indicate weak evi-
dence against the null hypothesis.
5.1. Experiments using Decision Trees
The experiments with the decision tree were conducted
using a dataset size of 8,117 incidents with 21 variables
of which 7,265 of the incidents are non-data loss while
852 incidents containing data loss incidents. The general
characteristics of this data is presented in Figure 2 and
details of different variables have been presented in Table
1 and 2.
For the first set of experiments, decision tree algorithm
was used to conduct analysis across different settings based
on varying distribution of training and test data i.e [7:3],
[6:4] and [6:4] with pruning where [x:y] represents (x%
training and y% test data). We present sample results
from these experiments with detailed discussion in this sec-
tion later on. The experiments were conducted using the
Recursive Partitioning And Regression Trees (RPART)
library which employs the Classification and Regression
(CART) algorithm. The model executed with standard
parameter settings on both training and testing data set.
The output has been presented in the confusion matrix in
the Figure 3. In particular, the Figure 3.a shows the con-
fusion matrix for the training data where the model had
an accuracy of 96.83% while a recall of 86.97%. The num-
ber of actual positives labelled correctly and the precision
of 82.67% demonstrates accuracy of the model from those
predicted positive. Additionally, the p-value is 0.03065
which demonstrates significance of the model. Further-
more, the Figure 3.b presents the confusion matrix for ex-
periments using previously unseen randomly selected test
data. The model produced an accuracy of 96.79% which
reflects high accuracy, generalization and effectiveness of
the algorithm in analysing previously unseen data. Fur-
thermore, the recall and precision rate also decreased for
these experiments strengthening the overall efficiency of
the approach. However, it is evident that the hypothesis
we are testing can be accepted as the p-value has decreased
to 0.0212 which is less than the threshold.
The Figure 4 shows the tree diagram produced from
the above experiment using CART decision tree algorithm.
The output seems quite interesting as the branches used
in the tree indicate high relevance to the problem. The
branches seem very informative as the algorithm identi-
fied number of nodes that upon manual analysis by do-
main experts are found to be relevant. The primary nodes
associated with a data loss used in the above tree along
with brief analysis of the output is presented below.
1. When Severity of an incident is Low or Medium, the
probability of an incident being a non-data loss is
89% which inversely means there is 11% likelihood
of data loss based on 100% observation cover.
2. When the Severity is High and the Policy is either
P1 or P2 (representing information security policies),
the probability of data loss is 81% based 11% actual
observation cover. However, there is 19% likelihood
of the incident being a non-data loss incident.
3. When the Severity of an incident High & the Policy
is either P3 or P4, the probability of data loss is
88% based on 9% actual observation cover. However,
there is 12% likelihood of the incident being a non-
data loss incident.
4. When the Severity of an incident High & the Policy
is either P1 or P2 and the count of total incidents per
user is greater than or equal to 10, the probability of
data loss is 37%. In addition, if the count of number
keyword Matches is greater than 191, the probability
of data loss increases to 55% based on 2% observa-
tion cover. The inversion of this rule is that there
can be 45% likelihood of non-data loss incident.
The output is very promising as the association within
selected variables makes logical sense and the selected fea-
tures seem to have high significance to the hypothesis
tested in this empirical study. This is a desirable result,
however different sample size can affect the above result,
therefore an attempt of resampling the dataset was made
with the [6:4] ratio where 60% dataset was reserved for
training set and 40% for testing set.
Following the results from the above experimentation,
two further iterations of experiments were conducted us-
ing decision tree with different settings for training and
test data sets. In particular, iterations I and II had stan-
dard parameter settings of the decision tree algorithm with
two different sample sizes [7:3] and [6:4] for the training
and testing data. However, the iteration III was improved
based on outcomes of iteration II where the model pro-
duced an accuracy of 97.20%, precision of 87.65% and the
recall of 84.77%, which demonstrates effectiveness of the
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(a) Training (b) Test
Figure 3: Confusion matrix for A) training set and, B) test data
Figure 4: Sample tree for decision tree based experiments
approach. The Figure 5 shows the average True Positive
Rate (TPR) and the average False Positive Rate (FPR) for
all the three iterations conducted using decision trees. It
appears the classifier from the iteration III produces equal
True Positive rate as the classifier in iteration II however,
the accuracy and the average False Positive rate of the
final model iteration III is significantly higher than the
other iterations. A detailed evaluation of these results is
presented in the Section 6.
5.2. Experimentation with Random Forest
In order to assess the feasibility of using machine learn-
ing techniques to predict likelihood of insider threats, we
also conducted experiments using Random Forest algo-
rithm so as to achieve rigorous comparative analysis. As
Random Forest is an ensemble algorithm, a common phi-
losophy is that a prediction made by an ensemble model
is far better than a stand-alone method such as single de-
cision tree [37]. Ensemble model is typically envisaged
to achieve better accuracy (mean value) to the actual by
using sophisticated techniques such as bagging or hybrid
intelligence [38]. Unlike decision tree algorithm, in ran-
dom forest, it is difficult to trace through the tree node
and understand the reason for the prediction therefore,
the trees produced are not always methodical to explain
in all aspects [39]. Within our experiments, random forest
algorithm is used with the default parameter setting where
problem type is classification, number of trees set to 500
and the number of variables tried at each split is set to 4.
5.2.1. Sensitivity Analysis
As discussed before, one of the primary reasons for
lower prediction accuracy is that as there can be a pro-
portion of errors on the training and the test data. Con-
sequently, an attempt was made to identify features which
are most significant to achieving prediction. This is achieved
in two ways: a) using the Importance() function and b) us-
ing Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) where RFE se-
lects high relevance variables for the model removing the
weakest features.
Furthermore, the Figure 6 shows the importance of
each variable ordered by most - to least-importance. The
Mean Decrease Accuracy (MDA) shows the variables that
are most relevant to model accuracy where any variable
with a large (MDA) is more important. Mean Decrees
Gini (MDG) shows how each variable contributes to the
homogeneity of the nodes in the model. It appears, the
variable Severity has the most (MDA and MDG). This is
very concerning as having this variable may bring skew-
ness to the model. Therefore, in order to avoid skewness
of the model, our experimentation data excluded the value
of severity attribute so as to assess the significance of other
attributes towards prediction generated by random forest
algorithm.
Furthermore, variables including Has.Attachment, Ap-
pAccess, during_OfficeHrs, Employment.Status have the
lowest (MDA and MDG), indicating their relative insignif-
icance in predicting and splitting data. Therefore, these
variables can be omitted from the model. Finally, by_dpt_Median,
avg_of_dpt_total and count_of_total_incidents_per_user
have similar mean decrease accuracy. Thus, the variable
with low error rate i.e. by_dpt_Median can be omitted
as this would improve the performance of the model. As
stated in section 4.1, removing too many feature variables
could result in improper data separation, while having too
many variables will over fit the model. Prior to remov-
ing variables shortlisted above, a popular feature selection
method called RFE (Recursive Feature Elimination) was
used. RFE can help identify variables that are primarily
required to build an accurate model. RFE uses an outer re-
sampling method (Cross-validation) of 10 folds to evaluate
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(a) True Positive (b) Test
Figure 5: Average True Positive & False Positive rate of Decision Tree analysis
the performance of all the variables except the dependant
variable (Data Loss in this case). Figure 7 presents re-
sults produced from the 10-fold cross validation accuracy
produced as a part of RFE algorithm which demonstrates
selected 10 variables to achieve comparable accuracy.
Figure 6: Variable importance by Importance() function
Figure 7: Results produced from the RFE algorithm and variable
accuracy
The RFE algorithm selected 9 features including Sever-
ity, Local.Class, Sent_Date, Policy, avg_inc_per_dpt_total,
Matches, Count_total_incidents_per_user, R. Total and
Subject_type. From this, it is evident that apart from the
Severity variable, 5 other variables shortlisted as part of
decision tree experiment were not selected by RFE.
The Figure 8.a shows the confusion matrix produced
for the training set which indicates that the classifier is
extremely effective in terms of accuracy, precision and re-
call. The classifier has an average TPR of 99.73% which
is significantly high. Moreover, the model returned a p-
value of (0.00000056), indicating that null hypothesis can
be rejected.
Furthermore, the Figure 8.b shows the confusion ma-
trix for the test data set. The model produced an accu-
racy of 94.17%, precision of 82.82% and the recall 54.21%
which indicates that the accuracy, precision and recall
has reduced when compared to the training data. How-
ever, the model shows high significance as the p-value was
(0.00000008917) for the test data.
The Figure 9 shows a sample tree for analysis using
random forest algorithm. The tree is comprehensive when
compared with the previous trees mainly due to exclusion
of the Severity variable. The primary nodes used in the
tree that show data loss occurrence are as follows.
1. When the incident contains recipients and Sent Date
is either [January, June, July or October], there were
about 10% data loss incidents identified. Meanwhile,
if the Sent Date is [February, March, December], 5%
data loss incidents were identified.
2. When the incident with no internal recipients and
the avg_of_dpt_total is less than or equal to 3.6%
and Subject Type is either [Forward or Reply], there
were about 40% data loss incidents identified. Any
incidents with Subject Type [New] represents 20% of
data loss incidents.
3. Once again, incidents with no internal recipients and
the avg_of_dpt_total is greater than 3.6% and the
avg_inc_per_dpt_total greater than 64.3%, there
were 100% data loss incidents identified.
4. Furthermore, incidents with no internal recipient and
where the avg_of_dpt_total is greater than 3.6%
and the avg_inc_per_dpt_total is less than or equal
to 64.3%, and the Subject Type is [Forward], there
were 20% data loss incidents identified.
5. Finally, when the incident does not contain any in-
ternal recipient and the avg_of_dpt_total is greater
than 3.6% and the avg_inc_per_dpt_total is less
than or equal to 64.3%, and the Subject Type is [New]
or [Reply] and the avg_dpt_total is less than 16.4%,
there were only 10% data loss incidents identified.
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(a) Training (b) Test
Figure 8: Confusion matrix for A) training set and, B) test data
It is evident that above model had good accuracy and
precision rate though the recall is low. The current Out
of Bag (OOB) estimate error rate is 5.86%. Further im-
provements can be made to the model in order to obtain
better recall. This is achieved by tuning number of pa-
rameters e.g. ntree – which specifies number of trees to
grow and mtry – number of variables randomly sampled
as candidates at each split in a tree. The tuneRF func-
tion was used to identify the best mtry values. Setting
these parameters would reduce the complexity of the over-
all model and also produces less OOB error. Fig 10 shows
the OOB error graph where it is evident that the error
rate stabilizes after about 1,400 trees. Therefore, the opti-
mal number of ntree can be set to 1,400. Furthermore, to
identify the optimal number of mtry via tuneRF function
is presented in Fig 11 which identified that lowest OOB
error rate is achieved when number of mtry is 10 and es-
timate OOB error is 5.11% which is reduced by 0. 26%
when compared to the initial model.
Overall, our experimentation with Random Forest al-
gorithm was conducted over four iterations where the it-
eration 1 and 2 were preformed with standard parameter
settings of the Random Forest algorithm. Both these it-
erations were conducted with two different sample sizes
i.e. [6:4] and [7:3] for the training and test data. Even
though the first two iterations had a good result in terms
of accuracy, precision and recall, both models showed less
significance in validating the hypothesis where the p-value
is greater than 0.05. However, this problem was addressed
in the following iterations iteration 3 and 4 by feature re-
duction and parameter tuning. The Figure 12 shows the
average True Positive Rate and the average False Positive
Rate for experiments conducted with Random Forest us-
ing previously unseen test data. As is evident from Fig 12,
iteration III had an average True Positive rate of 88.90%
while it produced an average False Positive rate of 22.18%
which indicated a good starting point. However, in the
iteration IV, the model appears to have improved as the
average True Positive rate raised to 90.79% as well as the
average False Positive rate reduced to 18.98%.
6. Analysis and Discussion
The graphs in the Figure 13 shows the summary of
accuracy, precision and recall produced for all three iter-
ations using Decision Trees. Based on above figures, it
appears the decision tree algorithm maintained a superior
accuracy, precision and recall throughout all three itera-
tions. The accuracy and the recall of the models seems to
have improved in each iteration. However, the precision
in the iteration III had decreased by a fraction. Addition-
ally, as the average False Positive Rate of the final model
in the Iteration III was small (7%), it demonstrates the
effectiveness of improvements made in the final model.
Similarly, the Figure 14 presents the summary of the
accuracy, precision and recall produced for all four itera-
tions using Random Forest algorithm. The first two mod-
els seem to have outperformed in both test and training
data as they produced the highest accuracy i.e. 97.38%
and 97.66% respectively. However, both models were ren-
dered insignificant as the p-value was greater than 0.05.
However, improvements such as parameter tuning and fea-
ture reduction were made in the following iterations which
improved the efficiency of the model. The model produced
in iteration III had an accuracy of 94.17%, precision of
82.82% and the recall was 54.22%. The recall seems to
have reduced but the model had an average False Posi-
tive rate of 22.18%. Furthermore, the model produced an
F1 score of 65.53% which can be considered as a good
model as this score indicates a balance between recall and
precision. In the final model further improvements were
made which produced an increased accuracy of 94.95%,
as well as increasing precision to 85.20% and the recall of
63.98% which is more stable, as it has almost increased by
10% when compared with the previous version. The final
model had an average False Positive rate of 18.98%.
The Figure 15 shows the F1 score (the balance perfor-
mance measure between precision and the recall) produced
for the Random Forest algorithm. It appears the model in
iteration III had an F1 Score of 65.53 which seems to be
an average score. Meanwhile, the final model in iteration
IV had an increased F1 score of 73.09. This score can be
considered as ideal score in comparison with the accuracy
of the model.
6.1. Analysis of results
The primary aim of this research was to implement a
machine learning model to predict likelihood of legitimate
data loss occurrences based on historical DLP email in-
cident data. Although, there were number of challenges
encountered during each iteration for the chosen machine
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Figure 9: Sample tree for Random Forest experiments
Figure 10: Finding best ntry value - OOB error rate
learning techniques, it is evident that experiments with
both selected machine learning techniques produced posi-
tive results. However, the final models produced for each
machine learning technique resulted different performance
levels in terms of accuracy, precision and recall. A sum-
mary of results for both techniques along with different
evaluation criteria is presented in the Table 3 with analy-
sis presented below to identify the most effective model.
Due to the complexity of the analysis involved, we set
the threshold for satisfactory outcome of experimentation
to be an accuracy of minimum 85% with an average True
Figure 11: Minimum OOB error: mtry value
Positive Rate of at least 80% and a F1 Score of at least
70%. Based on the results produced with Decision Tree
algorithm presented in section 5.1, it is evident that all
three iterations achieved more than 80% in terms of accu-
racy, precision and recall values. Therefore, a balance F1
performance measure is not required in all three occasions.
However, the average F1 Score is 83.50% which meets all
of our success factors. In addition, the pruned model pro-
duced in iteration III demonstrated much improved perfor-
mance due to parameter tuning resulting in an economical
False Positive rate of 7% which is improved by 1% when
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(a) True positive rate (b) False positive rate
Figure 12: Summary of average true positive and false positive rate for Random Forest
(a) Accuracy (b) Precision (c) Recall
Figure 13: A) Accuracy, B) Precision, and C) Recall for Decision Tree experiments
compared with results of iteration II. Finally, although the
tree produced in the pruned model looks complete but the
nodes and leaves are restricted due the use of Severity vari-
able which was revealed as part of the experiments with
Random Forest algorithm.
As part of experiments with Random Forest algorithm,
the use of variable importance function and RFE algorithm
revealed that Severity variable had potentially caused the
insignificance for iteration I and II. Therefore, in order
to address the potential skewness of the data, further ex-
periments were conducted by excluding this variable from
sample data which resulted in improved performance by
the Random Forest algorithm towards validating the hy-
pothesis and producing good accuracy and precision in the
following iterations. However, the F1 score for iteration III
was 65.53% which is below the success criteria we defined
and therefore this model is not regarded as the optimal.
The improvements made in the iteration IV were ef-
fective, especially identifying appropriate number of mtry
which produced minimal OOB error, along with removing
additional variables that were least relevance had made
significant improvements in terms of performance to the
final model. For instance, for the training data, the fi-
nal model produced an accuracy of 99.92% followed by
precision of 100% and the recall of 99.32% with an aver-
age False Positive rate reaching at 0.07%. The overall F1
Score was 99.66% which indicated the model has an out-
standing balanced performance and the parameter tuning
were optimal. These improvements affected when predict-
ing on the test data in a positive way. The prediction on
the test data seems little decreased but still maintained
the accuracy almost 95% followed by the improved pre-
cision of 85.20%. The recall value was the main concern
as it was not meeting the minimum requirement of this
project. Having made the changes, the recall had increased
to 63.98% which is almost 10% increase. Moreover, the
model had an average false positive rate of 18.98%, which
has decreased by 2%. When considering the actual false
positive rate for a Data Loss occurrence is about 14.79%
while the F1 Score had hiked to 73.09%. This tells the
final model produced in iteration IV is exceptionally good
while meeting all the 3 criteriaâĂŹs to be considered as a
successful model.
Finally, the tree produced in iteration IV, shows the
utilisation of custom variables with meaningful nodes and
leaves appears to be more logical and realistic. The in-
fluence of the tree is remarkable as the tree shows unique
characteristics of incident that contributes larger propor-
tion to a legitimate Data Loss. The characteristics are
(incidents triggered during the office hours, subject type
is New and the policy is P3, when email contains only 1
external recipient and the count of incidents per employee
for department average is > 6%).
Through a detailed inspection of the results across all
iterations, it was identified that decision tree models utilised
all the feature variables provided and demonstrated bet-
ter performance as compared to Random Forest models.
However, a thorough examination of the results it was dis-
covered that the decision tree model failed to indicate po-
tential limitations of the features provided which may re-
quire further adjustments. We conclude this to indicate
reduced reliability for the results generated and therefore
model cannot be fully trusted. On the contrary, Random
Forest algorithm indicated that the model is insignificance
although the accuracy was demonstrated as high. This en-
abled to perform further adjustments to the model and the
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(a) Accuracy (b) Precision (c) Recall
Figure 14: A) Accuracy, B) Precision, and C) Recall for Random Forest experiments
Evaluation measure Decision Tree (CART) Random Forest
Classifier Test data Test data Validationdata Test data Test data
Validation
data
Severity feature not included included included not included included included
Accuracy 97.20% 92.80% 83.41% 97.66% 94.95% 90.03%
Recall 84.78% 55.17% 39.09% 84.67% 63.98% 75.60%
Precision 87.65% 72.72% 72.25% 91.70% 85.20% 79.88%
F-measure 86.19% 62.74% 54.00% 88.04% 73.09% 77.68%
Average TPR 92.95% 79.40% 78.58% 95.00% 90.80% 86.34%
Average FPR 7.04% 25.60% 21.41% 5.00% 18.98% 13.65%
Table 3: Summary of experimentation results and analysis
Figure 15: F1 performance measures for Random Forest
feature variables and therefore further experiments using
reduced feature set were performed as part of iteration IV
with Random Forest model. The model had an accuracy
of 92.98% with a precision of 72% followed by recall of
55.17%. In addition, the F1 Score was 62.74. In view of
all the aspects discussed so far, this identifies final model
implemented in iteration IV using Random Forest algo-
rithm to be the optimal and most effective in comparison
with other iterations with both Decision Tree and Random
Forest algorithms.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
A DLP system provides defence in depth for enter-
prise security systems by enabling detection and preven-
tion of accidental and malicious data loss. It therefore
enables protection against potential financial and reputa-
tional damages as well as compliance with emerging data
protection legislation such as GDPR. However, a typical
DLP system produces a large volume of alerts which also
include significant proportion of false positives. Conse-
quently, identifying legitimate data loss can be very chal-
lenging as each incident comprises of different character-
istics often requiring extensive intervention by a domain
expert to review alerts individually. This limits the ability
to detect data loss alerts in real-time making organisations
vulnerable to financial and reputational damages. This pa-
per has presented a novel method using machine learning
techniques to strengthen data loss detection capabilities of
a DLP system. We conducted extensive experimentation
using single decision tree and Random Forest algorithms
with historical email incident data collected by a globally
established telecommunication enterprise. The final model
produced with Random Forest algorithm was identified as
the most effective as it was successfully able to predict
approximately 95% data loss incidents accurately with an
average true positive value of 90%. Furthermore, the pro-
posed solution successfully enables identification of legiti-
mate data loss in email DLP whilst facilitating prioritisa-
tion of real data loss through human-understandable ex-
planation of the decision thereby improving the efficiency
of the process.
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